UNIT 4: A* ANSWER TO JUNE 2014 SCEN 1

June 2014 Scenario 1 question 01 Full marks 

This problem question was done in timed conditions as part of my mock exam at college, it got grade A*  being full marks! (25/25) - covers theft robbery burglary and making off.

Harry may be criminally liable for Theft under s1 of The Theft Act 1968. Theft occurs when a person "dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it". Appropriation under s3(1) is "any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner" which occurred as soon as Harry assumed the right to take the bicycle "harry took the bicycle" R v Morris.  Property wise this is clearly personal under s4(1). The bicycle remains  belonging to Earl under s5(1), regardless of the bicycle remaining in the true ownership of Harry R v Turner since Earl is nevertheless in "possession or control" of it as he is carrying out its repairs. Harry is unlikely to fit any exceptions under s2 calling for an application of Gosh. Harry’s actions may well be deemed dishonest by the standards of ordinary and reasonable people, especially since he chose to take the bike without correctly paying for its repair fees. It’s likely he also realised this since the facts in the scenario state "he changed his mind". Harry could also be said to have an intention to permanently deprive under s6(1) since he disposed regardless of Earls rights at that moment in time by taking the bike unpaid for, DPP v Lavendar. Theft is a likely outcome.

He could also be possibly liable for s8 Robbery within The Theft Act 1968.  Since theft is a pre-condition for liability, this has been satisfied R v Robinson.  It can be said that force has been used, "harry pushed earl" which is clearly sufficient. Furthermore it has to be done in order to steal, R v Donaghy and Marshall which it clearly has since "Earl rushed towards him"; without harry pushing him it’s likely the theft would not have succeeded. This also has to happen immediately before or at the time of doing so which it arguably has, "harry pushed earl" and then "took the bicycle" R v Hale. Finally Harry needs an intention to use force in order to steal, which is likely since he could be said to have desired earl to fall as this would help the theft of the Bike, R v Mohan

Harry could also be liable for Burglary under s9 of The Theft Act 1968. He could be liable for both 91a and b. Harry has entered R v Ryan "Harry entered the unlocked shed" as a trespasser perhaps, R v Collins  as we are aware he probably lacked permission "he knew earl was away at the time" into a building or part (s94 covers inhabitable vehicles or vessels) as the shed is likely to remain there Norfolk constabulary v Seekings and Gould He also has the initial intention prior to entry to commit theft "decided to get his bike back without paying" as was reckless as to whether earl would of given permission. He could also be guilty under s91b as having entered he actually committed theft and s20 GBH by "causing him to fall and cut his arm". Perhaps he had the intention then and there to commit gbh, or even being merely reckless R v Cunningham

Harry  may even be liable for making off without payment set out under s3. Goods or services need to be supplied (the repair of the bike) and completed, "earl told harry that he had finished repairing the bike" Troughton v MPC. Furthermore its likely payment on the spot was required or expected since the spot ( a question of fact, R v Mcdavvit) remained in the shed. Perhaps he even made off "harry took the bicycle". Mens rea wise this offence is likely since Harry knows payment was expected since he agreed to his arrangement, thus he is dishonest as previously clarified. He also could have an intention to permanently avoid payment, R v Allen - perhaps clarified when harry said "no way" to earls demand for payment. In that sense, an upholding of this conviction proves likely.

UNIT 3: CONSENT REVISION NOTES

Consent

Consent is always a defence to common assault or battery because there is injury caused. If injury is caused which then consent can only be a defence if it comes under one of the activities that the law will consent to.

There are two questions we ask:

1.       Was the consent genuine in terms of capacity and nature?

2.       Was the activity something the law will allow you to consent to?

Genuine (real) consent?

R v Tabassum – Consent to the operation was allowed but not touching V’s boobs. There must be a true consent where the defendant is consenting exactly to what is being carried out and the consequences. V cannot consent to having a tattoo done by an unclean pen if they have consented to a clean one. R v Olugboja – if the victim submits to the defendants conduct through fear then this does not prove the consent is real. R v Richardson – You can consent to something being done if D has not misrepresented their identity or purpose.

Capacity?

Gillick v West Norfolk Health Authority Scarman stated that consent is only true if the defendant has  “a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is being proposed”

Was the act something the law would allow you to consent to?
Disease transmission	R v Dica overruled Clarence stating that the victim had to consent to the risk of being infected by the disease, for D to be able to rely on the defence of consent.
Implied consent	Generally consent to minor touching e.g. everyday jostling’s cannot constitute a battery, Wilson v Pringle. This also applies to contact sports where a person agrees to the contact which is part of that sport. However if the contact goes beyond what is allowed within the rules then it is possible for an offence to be committed, e.g. rugby player consents to being tackled not having his head stamped by an opposition player.
Minor injury	Attorney general reference no 6 held that consent to s47 under the OAPA cannot be consented to (usually street fights etc) since “it is not in the public interest that people should cause or try to cause each other bodily harm for no good reason” But the sado masochism experienced by brown where none needed medical attention could not be consented to since SM’s have no way of fortelling the degree of harm that could come from their encounters – Templeman. So consent is not a defence to s47 offences.
Public policy exceptions – contact sports	Public policy exceptions where consent can be a defence to bodily harm include mutual manly contests and rough and undisciplined sport or play. This applies to sports like rugby or judo, however the defendant may not be able to rely on consent if: -          The contact goes beyond what is allowed within the rules then it is possible for an offence to be committed. -          The breach of rules Is a serious one since Barnes stated that where an injury is caused during a match then a criminal prosecution should be reserved to situations where the conduct was sufficiently grave to be properly categorised as criminal. (This was not the case in Barnes since D suffered a leg injury in a football match) Most organised sports generally have their own disciplinary procedures for enforcing their particular rules and standards of conduct. So contact sports where bodily injury is commonplace, D can plead. D can’t rely on consent if: -          Intended injury -          For reckless,  after play in a moment of excitement and anger -          Off the ball injuries If play is within the rules of the game and does not go beyond its likely D can use the defence since what he has done isn’t criminal. Things to consider; nature of the act, degree of force, extent of the risk of injury, D’s state of mind.
Body adornment	Tattooing is accepted as body adornment, it is accepted that people can consent to it, R v Wilson  - D had no aggressive intent.
Horseplay	Can consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay since they don’t usually intend to cause injury,  R v Jones.
Mistaken belief?	Where D genuinely but mistakenly believes that V is consent, then there is a defence to an assault, R v Aitken (set fire drunk to a man) Can even be a drunken mistake that the victim was consenting to horseplay for a charger under s20, R v Richardson and Irwin.
Euthanasia	You cannot consent to someone actively ending your life, but an informed adult can consent to life-saving treatment being withheld, Pretty v UK

UNIT 3: SELF DEFENCE REVISION NOTES

Self defence

-          This is a common law defence

-          It covers protecting yourself and another from harm

-          Can be split into public defence which is clarified by statute, and private defence which is based on common law and clarified by statute

Main questions we ask

1.     Was there an imminent threat

2.     Was reasonable force used in (sane) D’s circumstances?

Public defence

According to s3 of The Criminal Law Act 1967, you can act in public defence: “A person may use any such force that is reasonable in the circumstances, in the prevention of  crime”

R v Renouf – appealed since he was assisting the “lawful arrest of offenders” and the s3 defence was not put to the jury.

Private defence

Imminent threat

S 6A of the CJAIA 2008 states that a person not under any duty to retreat when acting for a legitimate purpose, but the possibility the person could have retreated will be considered when deciding if the force was necessary.

R v Hussain & Others – The force was not imminent since the attacker was running away

Malnik v DPP – There was no imminent threat and the defendant had created a dangerous situation by looking for the man

Attorney general no.2 – the exigency of the circumstance (riots) meant that he couldn’t be convicted since his pre-emptive method of making petrol bombs was warranted

R v Keane – no imminent threat due to the fact that this did not occur: violence offered by the victim was so out of proportion to what the original aggressor did that in effect the roles were reversed.

Reasonable in the circumstances that sane D believed them to be?

S76(3) states “ reasonable in the circumstances… as D believed them to be”

R v Owino – his actions were judged objectively and deemed too extreme, despite his subjective perception of events

R  v Oye – couldn’t rely on the defence since his psychiatric characteristics (insane) could not be brought into account on the issue of whether the degree of force was reasonable

Mistake as to threat?

Where D makes a genuine mistake, the jury have to decided whether force was necessary in the circumstances that he believed them to be76(3)AND under s76(4) they also have to consider if D’s mistake as to threat was genuine.

 R v Williams  - considering the defendants perception of events, his response was a reasonable one

Mistake due to intoxication

S76(5) states that D cannot rely on a mistaken belief if that mistake is made due to him being voluntarily intoxicated – R v O’grady

Degree of force

The amount of force which can be used in self defence states in 76(7) that “a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary action” e.g. stress

R v Clegg - the force had been excessive especially as there was no evidence that he believed the car to contain terrorists. Excessive force provides no defence.

Householder cases?

S.43 Crime and Courts Act 2013 If V is or is believed to be a trespasser in V’s dwelling then any force that is “not grossly disproportionate” is considered reasonable.

UNIT 3: INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTR REVISION NOTES

Involuntary manslaughter

-          Requires an unlawful killing but the defendant doesn’t have an intention for murder at all

-          Maximum sentence is life imprisonment OR a non-custodial sentence if the particular case is found suitable

Unlawful act manslaughter

-          D must have carried out an unlawful act. This is essentially a crime. It cannot be a tort, R v Franklin. It cannot be an omission, R v Khan and Khan, R v Lowe.

Dangerous?

-          The unlawful act that d carries out must be dangerous. It is dangerous according to the Church test which the jury have to be consider “might a sober and reasonable person might forsee the risk of some harm” occurring. Note that some harm remains largely ambiguous. Some harm accounts for anyone, not just the act that is aimed originally at that victim, R v Mitchell. Some harm includes harm to property and not a person, R v Goodfellow. Some harm is explicatory – it doesn’t equate to serious harm, JM & SM (bouncer who died due to dodgy artery).  But it doesn’t include fear or emotional disturbance, has to be shock or physical harm, R v Dawson. Doesn’t not matter that D did not realise there would be a risk of harm to another person also – R v Larkin. Punching was not considered dangerous r v carey coyle and foster.

-          R v Watson states that where the reasonable person would be aware of the victim’s frailty and the risk of physical harm to him, only then can certain cases can be considered dangerous. ( burglary would have been considered dangerous as soon as his condition  became apparent to the reasonable man)

Causes death?

-           Normal rules of causation – R v Kennedy, the victims informed and voluntary act breaks the chain of causation( no unlawful act by d administering a noxious substance since there was a voluntary intervening act

Mens rea?

-          That of the selected offence – most likely an intention all the time since they intended that but then it later resulted in death

-          NOTE: Not necessary for D to realise that A) his act was unlawful, and B) that that act was dangerous and could cause harm DPP v Newbury & Jones

Gross negligence

Duty of care

-          D must owe V a  duty of care. R v Adomako – civil concept partially applies. Number of cases where this comes about – Doctor and patient? (a) Omissions?, Evans?, captain and crew, Litchfield, landlord and tenant, singh? R v Khan and Khan states in their OBITER DICTA – duty could arise to summon medical assistance in certain circumstances, R v Dias – duty not to prepare and supply drugs, R v willougby – the fact the defendant and the victim were engaged in a criminal act did not prevent the defendant from owing a duty.

-           It is also irrelevant in criminal law (albeit relevant in civil) that the victims were party to an illegal act in R v Wacker

Gross?

-          Has to be a gross breach of duty. It becomes gross when it “goes beyond a mere matter of compensation” and “shows such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime”

-          R v Adomako says  the jury need to consider if “the conduct of the defendant will be so bad in all the circumstances as to amount to a criminal act or an omission” in which the Lord Mackay states that the jury should consider “whether the extent to which the defendants conduct departed from the proper standard of care” (e.g. doctor) and it “was such that is should be judged as criminal”

Risk of death

-          Gross breach of duty has to cause a risk of death, in R v Misra – Igor LJ said  it was not enough to show that there was risk of bodily injury or injury to health

Causes death?

Factual/legal/transferred mal?

UNIT 3: VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER REVISION NOTES

Defences to Voluntary Manslaughter (murder)

Diminished Responsibility

-          s2 of the homicide act 1957 as amended by s52 of the coroners and justice act 2009

-          Special partial defence to murder only

-          Reduces conviction not necessarily the sentence (judge’s discretion)

-          If D’s mental problem can be treated the judge may order treatment in hospital is carried out, or that a short imprisonment of community sentence(in extreme cases) is more suitable

BUT if the defendant’s mental issue cannot be treated and he is dangerous (e.g R v Byrne) then a judge may pass a sentence of life imprisonment.

-          Proved on the balance of probability by the defendant only (with medical evidence given at the time of the trial)

-          4 elements to be proved

s52 (1) Abnormality of mental functioning

R v Byrne

Lord Parker CJ – A state of mind that is “so different from that of the ordinary human being that the reasonable man would term it abnormal”

S52(1)(a)Caused by a recognised medical condition

Amended act does not give examples but battered wife syndrome(if it has been happening for possibly years or its long-term)Hobson(or Aluwahlia), Seers, Vinagre, Martin can be used

-          Also includes mental deficiency (speake), schizophrenia, chronic depression(gittens), paranoid depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder

-          Medical evidence would be needed in support of the claim(don’t forget to mention) but it’s the jury that needs to be satisfied that D’S AOMF aroused from a recognised medical condition

-          Can be physical – e.g. epilepsy of diabtes

So, D needs to have a recognised medical condition that can be supported by medical evidence, which can satisfy the Jury that the defendant’s abnormality of mental functioning arose from a recognised medical condition

S52(1)b Causes substantial impairment to the defendants ability to understand, form rational judgement, or exercise self control

(R v Lloyd) – Edmund Davies J - Substantial does not mean total nor does it mean trivial or minimal, it is somewhere in between – for the jury to decide

Understand? – does D’s condition cause him to act in an automatic state to where he does not know what he is doing. Is D suffering from delusions? Or has d got any severe learning difficulties who has a low mental age?

Reason? Paranoia or szhic? Battered wife syndrome?

Exercise self control? – Sexual phyco?

S52(1)(c) Provides an explanation to the killings - D’s abnormality of mental functioning must cause or contribute to his conduct in relation to the death of V

The above can be complicated with the presence of intoxication. There are two situations when this can arise.

1.     D has an AOMF and is intoxicated – jury are to disregard the intoxication, and decide whether the AOMF solitarily caused substantial impairment. They do not need to be satisfied that D would have killed R v Deitchman.

2.     OR when d’s long term alcohol abuse has led to a RMC like ADS or DDS, which causes an abnormality of mental functioning. In R v Wood, having that first drink sparked further involuntary drinking. Furthermore it was decided that a jury should question whether the ADS caused D to suffer from an AOMF, and did it cause substantial impairment(jury may question whether d’s craving was irresistible and whether the drinking up to the killing was voluntary)

Loss of control s54 CAJA 2009

1.       S54(2) D must be suffering from a loss of self control when doing the acts which caused the death, it need not be sudden, R v aluwahlia – may be a time delay between the qualifying trigger and the reaction of the defendant in regards to killing v (although the longer the wait the less likely a judge is going to put it to the jury or that the jury should believe D lost control)

BUT excludes acting in a considered desire for revenge (hints if D has taken a long time e.g 4 days as seen in R v Ibrahms and Gregory)

2.     S55 QT?

S55(3)Fear of serious violence – (martin) this is subjective, d will need to show he lost control due to a genuine fear of serious violence thus it being immaterial whether his belief is reasonable.

The fear of serious violence must be towards the defendant, or towards another person. But they MUST be identified – d cannot have a general fear of serious violence.

NOTE: if that fear isn’t immediate, i.e. the identified person is not in the close proximity of V at that time, then it might be hard for a jury to understandingly correlate the loc and this qt

S55(4) Grave Circumstance to which D has a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged?

This is partially objective due to the word “justifiable” here the judge will not take into account merely what d thought, but whether or not D had a right to think in that way  - R v Zebedee (2012 just because V shat himself doesn’t mean it was grave nor did the court successfully believe it was “justifiable”)

S55(5) acknowledges a combination of both above

Excluded factors under s55(6)

if there operates an excluded factor like the fact D’s loss of control was self induced to where D incited something to be said or done to provide him with the excuse of violence then the defence fails. This also goes the same for grave circumstance if he did something or said something that caused in him a sense of being seriously wronged and he incited this for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence, R v Johnson.

Also sexual infidelity is not a defence but it’s not entirely excluded if it operates amongst other factors to which it then can be considered, r v Clinton.

3.     Might a person of the same age and sex, with normal restraint and tolerance in D’s circumstances have acted in the same or a similar way?

Look at factors like d has been subject to abuse for a long time, or they have had serious violence to them before for the “circumstances” bit. R v Ashmeela also says that voluntary intoxication does not justify D’s loss of control in that situation so is not relevant.

If they have a short temper that doesn’t suffice since it only relates to D’S capacity and this test is judged OBJECTIVELY with NORMAL restraint and tolerance

UNIT 3; NON-FATAL OFFENCES REFORM REVISION PLAN

Non fatal reform plan

JUN 2010 Write a critical analysis of the current law on the non-fatal offences against the person. Include in your analysis a discussion of what reforms might be desirable.  – Start each reform “one that may be desirable is”

JUN 2011 The non-fatal offences against the person have been subjected to frequent criticism Explain and discuss these criticisms, and suggest what reforms might be desirable.

JUNE 2012 Consider what criticisms may be made of the non-fatal offences against the person. Discuss what reforms might be introduced to deal with these criticisms.

JUNE 2013 critically evaluate the current law on non-fatal offences, and suggest any reforms that you consider might improve the law. – one reform that could improve the law is…

Introduction	Professor David Ormerod QC on the law commission website recently stated with the emergence of the non fatals scoping paper that law on non fatals “is obscure and sometimes inaccurate” thus illuminating only one of the very criticisms with this area of law. A draft criminal law bill produced in 1993 (no 218), and a home consultation office paper produced by the law commission in 1988 exposes the laws anomalies and suggests areas for reform that according to Henry LJ in R v Lynsey is “in urgent need… to simplify it” As of  November 2014, by the Law Commission have introduced a Reform Of Offences Against The Person no. 217 scoping paper exploring the options for reform. Raising the possibility of a new offence of causing minor injury, according to Professor Omerod on the LC website, aims to resolve current inefficiency in how trials are allocated between courts and ensuring that they are tried relevantly in terms of “gravity and complexity”. Professor Omerord also stated that around 7-12 per cent of low level injury cases are tried in the crown court “yet receive sentences that could have been imposed in the magistrates”. This needs to be made more efficient. The scoping paper closed in February 2015 so there is hope these proposed reforms have gained the gravitas needed  to make change.
Issue 1 Archaic language and misleading	The language and law in this area of law has been criticised to be misleading and antiquated since numerous offences according to Omerod ( in light of the 2014 paper) states it “includes numerous offences that serve no purpose in modern society”. e.g. impeding a person endeavouring to save himself from shipwreck (section 17 of OAPA). Furthermore, the language is also outdated. The 2014 Paper picks out ‘bodily’  (para 3.7) which is liable to be understood as meaning the wrong thing. A normal reader thinks of physical injuries not suspecting that ‘bodily harm’ is capable of covering psychiatric conditions. Another example is the use of the word “assault” in section 47. This is misleading as battery can form the basis of section 47, not just assault. The interchangeable words of “cause” and “inflict are also an issue. The use of “malicious” in s18 wounding with intent has also come under scrutiny as the Men’s Rea is already defined as “with intent”, rendering the word “malicious” redundant. .
Reform	The draft bill suggested that antiquated or misleading language should be replaced with consistent and succinct vocabulary. An example of this is the draft bill opting to use to simply use “cause” rather than “occasion” or “inflict”. This makes the law more consistent. To clarify section 47, they have simply removed the offence, replacing it with clause 3 “intentionally or recklessly causing injury”. This is much more concise and removes any confusion regarding whether a battery can form the basis of s47. The same thing has occurred with “malicious”. Wounding with intent is replaced by clause 1 “intentionally causing serious bodily harm”. This is also more concise.
Issue 2 Badly defined and unorganised	Secondly, the law on non-fatals is perhaps badly defined and unorganised. Assault and Battery have no statutory definition, and the more serious offences are contained in the OAPA. Professor JC Smith described the law on non-fatals as a “rag bag of offences, put together with no thought to substance or form”.  In some situations the confusion with assault and battery can even produce unfair results. The 2014 Paper also that the terminology was ‘the main problem’ in that a defendant who has clearly carried out some kind of attack can sometimes slip through the crack between the two offences. This occurred in R (KRACHER) v LEICESTER MAGISTRATES’ COURT (2014) Here, Kracher was alleged to have punched V on the arm and threatened to beat him up but was only charged on the basis of the punch not the threat. Being unsure that a punch had been delivered the conviction was quashed. This is a major anomaly exposing how the unclear offences of assault and battery essentially allow some defendants to get off “scot free”.
Reform	The 1988 draft bill suggests that the badly defined current offences will be replaced with four sections. S18 will be replaced by s.1(1), intentionally causing serious injury to another person. S20 will be replaced by s.2(1), recklessly causing serious injury to another person. S47 will be replaced by s.3(1), intentionally or recklessly causing injury to another person.  Assault/battery will be replaced by s.4(1) A person is guilty of an assault if he intentionally or recklessly applies force to or causes impact on the body of another or  intentionally or recklessly causes the other to believe that any such force or impact is imminent. This reform will mean that all the non-fatal offences are found in one place, making the law more concise and therefore easier for the jury to understand and apply. This will also solve the issue of the law being a “rag bag of offences” by having them in one statute.
Issue 3 seriousness and hierarchy	The OAPA offences have been criticised for not being graded in terms of seriousness disobeying the general rule in criminal law that the men’s rea should match the Actus reus. The 2014 Paper states there is a “lack of correspondence between the external elements of the offence and the required mental element” which means D can be held liable for results that are more severe than what D intended or foresaw; this is unjust since D needs no awareness of the main ingredient of the offence. It seems unfair also that assault and battery carry a max Sentence of 6 months, whilst section 47 can carry 5 years, the only difference being the victim suffers some discomfort (Miller). It also seems wrong that section 47 and section 20 carry the same maximum sentence of 5 years, even though s20 is seen as a much more serious crime. Although the maximum sentence of s47 is rarely imposed, it seems strange that crimes of a different seriousness carry the same sentence. The gap between section 20 and section 18 could also be criticised. The jump in max sentence from 5 years to life seems questionably large, considering the only difference between the crimes is a marginally more serious men’s rea is s18. This may be justified, however, by the fact that S18 shares the Men’s Rea for murder, it is simply chance whether the person lives or dies.
Reform	Furthermore, the draft bill proposes to confront the issue of sentencing by matching the sentence to the crime, creating a fairer hierarchy. S1.1 (s18) would still have a max sentence of life. S.2.1 (s20) would rise from 5 to 7 years. S.3.1(s47) would remain at 5 years. S.4.1 would remain at 6 months with the alternative of a fine. By increasing the sentence for section 20, it shows the difference in seriousness from section 47. However, the gap between s20 and 18 remains large (7 years to life) this may require further thought.
Issue 4 Consent	Finally there remains issues with the law on non fatals in relation to consent. The 2014 Paper states its issue lie in the fact “that it depends entirely on fields of activity” and “It might be preferable to take account of factors such as degree of harm and the vulnerability of V.” Currently, there seems to be an overlap with the idea of certain moral rules accounting for what type of injury can be consented to, for example sadomaciscm as seen in R v Brown, The 2014 paper proposes that consent should be determined on the degree of harm and the vulnerability of V in relation to the occasioning injury, rather than morally wrong activities. One example is the fact that in R v Wilson, v suffered with s20 GBH from a tattoo infection but was allowed to consent, yet in R v Brown  one of the victims suffered from ABH, however this was not allowed consent to. This unfair inconsistency may lead us to question if the law should only restrict activities where pain is the primary purpose of public interest.
Reform	The Law Commission’s 2nd Consultation Paper on Consent (no. 139 1995) set out a specific definition of what Sado masochism however falling short of ABH. This could suggest that the decision in R v Brown could have been changed if the proposals were accepted. However there still seems to be the issue of moral activity playing a considerable part.
Conc	Overall, the laws on non fatals provide many flaws and reveal the possibility of it becoming outdated - the scoping paper is hope that this issue will be rendered. However its current operation reveals it should not be shunned entirely.